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ABSTRACT
This paper seeks to determine the impact of firm performance and CEO power on CEO turnover. Research in CEO turnover 
literature found that corporate performance is frequently used as an indicator to evaluate the effectiveness of CEO 
effort and findings from most of these studies indicate that the turnover rate of CEO is higher for poor performing 
firms when compared to well performing firms. Furthermore, social network theory and human capital theory suggest 
that CEOs gain their power from their educational background; skill and functional background; special expertise; 
experience; industry specialization; prestige; ownership; age; and length of tenure. This power will entrench the CEO in 
the company, thus making the decision to fire the underperforming CEO more difficult. Our results show that firms with 
poor performance and older CEOs are more likely to change their CEOs. In contrast, CEO turnover is less likely to occur 
when firms exercise CEO/Chairman duality; have CEOs who own a certain portion of company shares; and have CEOs 
with longer tenure. 
ABSTRAK
Kajian ini bertujuan untuk menentukan kesan prestasi syarikat dan kuasa CEO ke atas pertukaran CEO. Sorotan kajian 
berkaitan pertukaran CEO mendapati prestasi syarikat sering digunakan sebagai penentu dalam menilai keberkesanan 
usaha CEO dan penemuan daripada kajian tersebut mendapati kadar pertukaran CEO adalah tinggi bagi syarikat 
berprestasi rendah berbanding syarikat berprestasi tinggi. Selain daripada itu, teori rangkaian sosial dan teori modal 
insan mencadangkan bahawa CEO memperoleh kuasa melalui latar belakang pendidikan, latar belakang fungsi dan 
kemahiran, kepakaran, pengalaman, keutamaan industri, prestij, pemilikan, umur dan tempoh memegang jawatan 
yang lama. Kuasa ini akan mengukuhkan kedudukan CEO dalam sesebuah syarikat yang menjadikan proses membuat 
keputusan bagi melucutkan jawatan CEO berprestasi rendah lebih sukar. Dapatan kajian menunjukkan syarikat 
berprestasi rendah dan mempunyai CEO yang berumur lebih cenderung untuk menukar CEO. Sebaliknya, pertukaran 
CEO adalah rendah bagi syarikat yang mempraktikkan dwi peranan CEO/Pengerusi, mempunyai CEO yang mempunyai 
pemilikan saham syarikat dan CEO yang memegang jawatan untuk satu tempoh masa yang lama. 
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INTRODUCTION
A chief executive officer (CEO) is regarded as the 
mastermind of a business. This is because any action 
taken by the CEO or taken against the CEO will have 
an impact on a firm’s strategies, policies and future 
performance. Researchers in CEO turnover literature 
found that corporate performance is frequently used as an 
indicator to evaluate the effectiveness of a CEO’s efforts 
(Fan et al. 2007; Kaplan 1994; Maury 2006; Suchard et 
al. 2001).  Findings from most of these studies indicate 
that the turnover rate of CEO is lower for well performing 
firms, as compared to poor performing firms. The authors 
believe that CEO turnover is triggered by poor corporate 
performance, rather than good corporate performance. 
However, the establishment of power by CEOs via CEO/
chairman duality, ownership, tenure, education level, 
age and skill makes them immune from firm poor 
performance. In other words, the powerful CEOs remain 
at their posts, even though they are the ones who should 
take the responsibility for the poor performance of the 
firm, via a treat of termination. Thus, the aim of this 
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paper is to investigate the relationship between firm 
performance, CEO power and CEO turnover.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. 
The second section of this paper presents a review of 
the literature, emphasizing the theoretical background 
and specific theories and empirical evidence that lead 
to the development of the hypothesis. This is followed 
by a discussion on the methods that are employed in 
conducting this study. The results of this study are 
presented in the following section. Finally, the conclusion 
and discussion are presented at the end of this paper.
LITERATURE REVIEW 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The idea of CEO turnover study stems from research on 
executive compensation and firm performance premised 
upon principal-agent theory. As the pay-performance 
relationship is used as a contract between a CEO and a 
firm, CEO turnover is also a means to encourage CEOs to 
do their best. Related to that argument, a CEO is assumed 
to take the dismissal threat into account when running 
company activities. 
Agency theory is the main underpinning theory 
which is built on the separation of ownership and control 
in an organization. The separation between ownership 
and control leads to self-interested action by those in 
managers-controlled firms (Jensen & Meckling 1976). 
As experts of firm-specific knowledge, managers are 
believed to have gained advantage over firm owners. 
They may pursue actions which benefit themselves and 
not the firm’s owners. In order to control the managers’ 
action, a board of directors exists to serve the monitoring 
function. Although agency theory is the main foundation, 
other theories, such as social network theory and human 
capital theory, also contribute to the explanation of firm 
performance, CEO power and CEO turnover relationship.
Hungenberg et al. (2007) claim that human capital 
theory is based upon resource-based theory, which 
mainly concentrates on the specific type of resources to 
which it assigns an accentuated role.  This specific type 
of resource is the human capital which comprises all 
individual skills, abilities and experiences of a company’s 
employees and managers at all levels. Human capital 
theory assumes that valuable resources which cannot or 
can hardly be imitated, substituted and transferred are the 
main prerequisites for a company’s success. Meanwhile, 
social network theory explains how CEOs accumulate 
power using several mechanisms (Cannella & Lubatkin 
1993; Datta & Guthrie 1994; Goodstein & Boeker 1991; 
Phan & Hoon 1995). They suggest that CEOs use social 
co-optation and political pressure to weaken and resolve 
the board of directors’ power in their decision to fire 
them. This social co-optation and political power are 
derived through CEOs involvement as insiders of firms 
who have control over valuable resources, via the duality 
position of CEO and the Chairman, and/or through CEOs’ 
ownership in the firm. With regard to the power that CEOs 
possess, Phan and Hoon (1995) claim that they tend to 
manipulate power given by the boards for their own 
advancements, rewards and prerequisites. This power 
will create a shield for them from being monitored 
by boards and being fired for not being effective and 
efficient.
The following section concentrates on the relevant 
literature to support the hypotheses. The review is 
primarily developed based upon the agency theory 
framework, which is concerned about the separation 
of powers between principals and agents. This theory 
assumes that the agent will act in the best interest of the 
owners. Human capital theory and social network theory 
are also used as complementary theories to agency 
theory. 
CORPORATE PERFORMANCE AND CEO TURNOVER
Previous studies in the UK, the US, Japan and Germany 
report that CEO turnover is associated with poor 
performance (Goyal & Park 2002; Kang & Shivdasani 
1995; Kaplan 1994; Lausten 2002; Maury 2006). These 
studies discuss that the coefficient of market adjusted 
return is negatively significant with CEO turnover. The 
same results are also captured when the accounting 
performance is used as performance measurement. In 
short, although different performance measures are 
used, their results are similar as they find an inverse 
relationship between CEO turnover and performance. 
Their findings support the view that low performance 
leads to higher turnover rate. The poor performers are 
dismissed from the companies as there is a threat of 
monitoring efforts by the board of directors. This is 
because the board believes that the underperforming 
CEO should be penalized for the poor performance of the 
firms. Their results are consistent with agency theory that 
the threat of turnover will ensure that the CEO’s action is 
aligned with the shareholders’ interest. Thus, based on 
the above arguments, it is hypothesized that:
H1 Poorly performing firms are more likely to change 
their CEOs.
CEO DUALITY AND CEO TURNOVER
The proponents of stewardship theory suggest that the 
joint structure provides unified firm leadership, and 
removes any internal or external ambiguity regarding 
who is responsible for firms, process and outcomes. 
Further, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) assert that the 
monitoring management can be more efficient via CEO/
chairman duality. They argue that less contracting is 
needed and information asymmetry is reduced when CEO 
is also Chairman of the firm. In contrast, Pi and Timme 
(1993) argue that cost-efficiency and return on assets are 
lower when the CEO is also the chairman. As the CEO/
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chairman has a concentrated power base, this situation 
will allow the CEO to make decisions for his/her own-self 
interest at the expense of shareholders. 
According to social network theory, CEOs with 
dual roles have greater formal and informal powers. 
These powers will allow the board to make decisions 
that are contrary to that of the CEOs. By focusing on 
board effectiveness, Fama and Jensen (1983) claim 
that the concentration of decision management and 
control of decisions control in one individual reduces 
board effectiveness in the monitoring of firms’ CEOs. In 
addition, the internal control of a firm is regarded as a 
failure when the CEO is also the chairman of the board 
(Jensen 1993). Empirical evidence by Goyal and Park 
(2002) and Maury (2006) demonstrate that CEOs are less 
likely to get replaced following poor firm performance 
when the CEO is also a chairman. Their results support 
the proposition that duality of board structure will reduce 
the monitoring efforts by board, including dismissing the 
underperforming CEO. Thus, the hypothesis is:
H2  Firms with incumbent CEO holding both CEO and 
chairman posts are less likely to change their CEOs.
CEO EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND CEO TURNOVER
Bantel and Jackson (1989) assert that CEOs who attained 
a higher level of education are assumed to have a higher 
cognitive ability. They are claimed to be more effective 
in generating and implementing creative solutions to 
complex problems. A study conducted by Thomas et 
al. (1991) reveals that CEOs with high education levels 
tend to pursue strategies that emphasize differentiation 
and innovation. Empirical evidence from Hambrick and 
Mason (1984) reveals that education level has positive 
effects on the top manager’s knowledge, capacity of 
information processing, tolerance and creative power. 
A study on CEO or chairman turnover in Taiwan by 
Ou-Yan and Shuang-shii (2007) finds that CEO educational 
background has a significantly negative association with 
the likelihood of CEO turnover. Thus, based on the human 
capital theory perspective, an individual that has a higher 
level of educational background is considered to be a 
firm specific asset and less likely to be dismissed. Thus, 
it is hypothesized that:
H3 Firms with higher educational background CEOs 
are less likely to change their CEOs.
CEO SKILL AND FUNCTIONAL BACKGROUND AND CEO 
TURNOVER
Human capital theory argues that if a CEO has high 
firm specific assets, his or her dismissal will represent 
the loss of firm-specific human capital investment 
(Phan & Hoon 1995). Many things contribute to the 
building and accumulation of human capital, such as 
skills and functional specialization. An incumbent’s 
skill specialization is an indication of job relevance and 
industry specific training that a CEO brings to the job. 
These experiences will reduce the cost of human capital 
training to the firms and, at the same time, allows the 
incumbent CEO a higher level of productivity. 
With reference to specific functional knowledge, 
Zajac and Stearns (1997) argue that a CEO with finance 
and legal background is more professional than a CEO 
with other functional background. Since the skills of 
the former are more generalizable and appropriate for 
most firms, they tend to move from one company to 
another. This view implies that the turnover of CEOs with 
a finance or legal background is more frequent than those 
with other functional backgrounds. Following Zajac and 
Stearns (1997) proposition, we hypothesize that:
H4 Firms with finance and legal background CEOs will be 
more likely to change their CEOs.
AGE OF CEO AND CEO TURNOVER
The age of the CEO also plays a significant role in 
estimating the probability of turnover. In order to test 
the effect of age on the probability of turnover, previous 
studies normally divide age into two categories, 
consisting of younger CEOs and older CEOs (Borokhovich 
et al. 2006; Coughlan & Schmidt 1985; Goyal & Park 
2002; Lausten 2002). Previous literature from the UK and 
the US shows that the normal retirement age is between 
54-55 years old. Therefore, a CEO whose age is less than 
54 is considered as a young CEO, whereas a CEO whose 
age is more than 55 is considered as an older CEO. 
The separation of age is needed due to different 
performance evaluation applied to  CEOs at different 
ages and the resulting difference on the probability 
of CEO turnover. For example, Lausten (2002) tests 
the effect of age in the relationship between turnover 
and performance. The author finds that the turnover-
performance relationship for younger CEOs is based on 
the pre-tax accounting profits for the preceding years, 
whereas the relationship for older CEOs is concentrated 
on the proportion of the pre-tax accounting profits to the 
annual sales in the firms. This result suggests that young 
CEOs are assessed on the basis of increasing profit alone, 
whereas better results including both the profit and the 
annual sales are expected from the older CEOs.
With regards to the probability of being dismissed, 
Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) and Borokovich et 
al. (2006) claim that a CEO whose age is less than 54 
is considered a younger CEO and not influenced by 
a mandatory retirement compared to a CEO whose 
age is more than 55. The young CEO is more likely to 
be disciplined by the threat of turnover when firm 
performance is poor compared to the old CEO who is 
close to retirement age. Both studies find a negative 
coefficient for younger CEOs in the turnover-performance 
relationship. In contrast, Goyal and Park (2002) find the 
coefficients of CEO age and the dummy ages of 53 to 55 to 
be both positive and statistically significant, at less than 1 
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percent level. A similar finding is derived by DeFond and 
Park (1999), who find a positive relationship between 
older CEOs and probability of turnover. They explain 
that their contradicting result is due to the inclusion of 
mandatory retirements at age 55 in the US-based firms. 
Based on the above findings, the following hypothesis 
is developed:
H5  Firms with older CEOs are more likely to change their 
CEOs. 
CEO TENURE AND CEO TURNOVER
Tenure is another demographic factor that influences the 
threat of CEO turnover, either positively or negatively. If 
a longer tenure is a clue that a CEO is closer to retirement, 
CEO tenure and CEO turnover are positively related. For 
example, Lausten (2002) finds a significant positive 
tenure coefficient which indicates that the longer the 
CEO has been in the position as a CEO, the higher the 
probability of turnover. 
Alternatively, social network theory claims that 
CEOs would establish a power base over time. Shen 
and Cannella (2002) suggest that new CEOs confront 
significant challenges upon taking office. They need 
to adjust to their new roles and quickly develop good 
working relationships with other members of their top 
management groups, board of directors and powerful 
outside stakeholders. As time passes, whereby 
incumbent CEOs have proven their leadership capacity 
and established their authority in office, the challenges 
would then be greatly reduced. Thus, it is expected that 
the longer a CEO has been in the firm, the less likely he 
is to be removed unless he reaches retirement age. Goyal 
and Park (2002) include tenure as a control variable in 
their study and find that the estimated coefficient on 
the CEO tenure is negative and significant. This result 
suggests that the probability of CEO turnover is less 
likely when CEOs have longer tenure. A similar finding 
is derived from a study by Shen and Cannella (2002), 
who find that CEOs with shorter tenure are more likely to 
be dismissed than CEOs with a longer tenure. Thus, we 
hypothesize the following:
H6 Firms with longer tenure CEOs are less likely to 
change their CEOs.
CEO OWNERSHIP AND CEO TURNOVER
The percentage of shares owned by CEOs may have a 
significant influence on CEO succession. It is expected 
that when CEOs have a controlling interest over the 
firms, they may be involved in making firms’ decision, 
including decisions regarding the termination of the 
underperforming CEO and the naming of the successor. 
A high CEO ownership is less likely to be associated 
with CEO turnover (Denis et al. 1997; Iqbal & French 
2007). However, a study by Ghosh et al. (2007) provides 
evidence that the controlling power of CEOs over firms’ 
decisions depends upon the level of ownership possessed 
by the CEO. If the controlling power is less than 5 percent, 
the influence is not significant. However, when the 
controlling power is more than 25 percent, the influences 
increase significantly. In short, as the controlling power 
of a CEO increases, the probability of CEO turnover 
decreases. Thus, the following hypothesis is developed: 
H7 Firms with CEO ownership are less likely to change 
their CEOs.
METHODOLOGY
Data on CEO turnover and CEO power are gathered from 
company annual reports and Bursa Malaysia’s website 
under the company announcement section, while data 
for corporate performance is gathered from Datastream. 
The unit of analysis for this study is individual CEO 
turnover in Malaysian public listed companies. The 
population of this research comprises of companies that 
are traded and listed on the Main Board and Second 
Board of Bursa Malaysia, including both high and low 
performing firms during the four year interval, between 
2002 and 2005. This study chooses 2002 as the starting 
point, as it follows the recovery of financial crisis in 
1997-1998 and the implementation of the Malaysian 
Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG). The ending 
period of 2005 is chosen due to the introduction of the 
new standards by Financial Reporting Standards (FRSs) 
that replace the standards established by the Malaysian 
Accounting Standard Board (MASB). The new standards 
impact the calculation of accounting ratios used in this 
study. Furthermore, the four-year period is selected as 
the duration of study following the suggestion made by 
Dahya et al. (2002), who claim that CEO change studies 
need to have a longitudinal period to cater for turnover 
events since CEO turnover is determined by comparing 
the names of CEOs from one year to the next. The general 
CEO turnover model is as follows:
P(CEO turnover =1) =  ƒ (firm performance, CEO powers) 
where P(CEO turnover), the estimated conditional 
probability of CEO turnover, is a function of firm 
performance and CEO powers. To estimate this model, 
the logistic regression is used due to the binary nature of 
the dependent variable that violates the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression assumptions. Table 1 displays 
the independent variable used in this study. 
RESULTS
The sample of this study is all companies listed on the 
Main Board and the Second Board of Bursa Malaysia 
that changed their CEOs between 2002 and 2005. After 
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the screening process, 145 CEO turnover companies were 
eligible to be included in the analysis. These companies 
were matched with the same number of companies that 
did not change their CEOs, resulting in a final sample of 
290.
Panel A and Panel B of Table 2 display the descriptive 
statistics for both continuous and dichotomous variables. 
It shows that, on average, the sample companies have a 
healthy performance with an average ROA of 0.043. The 
average age of CEOs is 54 years old and the average tenure 
is 111 months. Only 8.3% of the companies exercise CEO/
Chairman duality. As many as 184 CEOs possess degree 
qualification, while only 18 CEOs possess qualification in 
finance and law. Out of the 290 CEOs, 186 (64%) own 
some shares in a company while the remaining do not.  
TABLE 1.  Summary of main independent variables and alternative proxies
Variables Label Description
Corporate 
Performance
AVROA ROA is the ratio of accounting earnings before interest and taxes to the book value of 
assets. The average, AVROAt is measured as (ROAt-1+ROAt-2)/2 
Board Leadership DUALITY Equals ‘1’ if chairman is also the CEO/MD during the year preceding CEO turnover and ‘0’ otherwise.
CEO Academic 
Qualification
EDU Equals ‘1’ if CEO possesses a degree and above and ‘0’ otherwise.
CEO Skill SKILL Equals ‘1’ if CEO has a degree with finance and legal studies and ‘0’ otherwise.
CEO Age AGE
Age_1
Age of CEO
Equals ‘1’ if it is 55 years of age or less and ‘0’ otherwise.
CEO Tenure TENURETENURE_1
Number of months the CEO had held the position.
Equals ‘1’ if tenure is less than 60 months in the year preceding CEO succession and 
‘0’ otherwise
CEO Ownership
OWN
OWN_1
Percentage of shares owned by CEO during the year preceding CEO succession. 
Equals ‘1’ if CEO own a percentage of shares less than 5 percent, between 5 percent to 
25 percent, and more than 25 percent, and ‘0’ otherwise.
Sources: The first variables are obtained from Datastream whereas the rest are from the companies’ annual reports.
TABLE 2. Descriptive statistics
Variables
Panel A: Continuous Variables Panel B: 
Dichotomous VariablesMean Std. Dev
AVROA 0.043 0.147
AGE
1 if CEO age < 65 year
      0 if CEO age ≥ 65 year
53.559 8.980
262(90.3%)
28(9.7%)
OWN
      1 if CEO owns company shares
      0 if CEO does not own shares
15.195 20.022
186 (64.1%)
104 (35.9%)
TENURE (month)
      1 if CEO tenure less than 5 years
      0 if CEO tenure more than 5 years
111.165 93.637
119 (41.0%)
171 (59.0)
DUALITY
      1 if CEO = Chairman
      0 if  CEO ≠  Chairman
24 (8.3%)
166 (91.7%)
EDU
      1 if CEO holds degree and above
      0 if  CEO does not hold degree
184 (63.4%)
106 (36.6%)
SKILL
      1 if CEO with finance or law qualification
      0 if CEO without finance or law qualification
18 (6.2%)
271(93.7%)
Note: N = 290 observations.
Results from the logistic regression analysis are 
presented in Table 3. This study assumes that poor 
performance leads to CEO turnover.  Therefore, as 
hypothesized in H1, we expect that there will be a 
negative relationship between performance and CEO 
turnover.  As expected, this study finds a negative and 
significant relationship between CEO turnover and 
average prior performance (AVROA). The finding of 
this study is similar to the findings in studies conducted 
by Kaplan (1994), Suchard et al. (2001) and Tsai et al. 
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(2006), which determine that lagged performance is 
significant in determining CEO turnover. This finding 
is in line with the statements by Boeker and Goodstein 
(1993), claiming that an organization may not ordinarily 
react to poor performance by replacing its CEO in the 
same year the poor performance occurs. Therefore, they 
suggest that the average of two year prior performance 
is the best performance indicator to be used in the CEO 
turnover study. 
TABLE 3. Regression analysis 
Variables
Expected
Sign
B S.E. Wald Sig.
1-tailed test
Exp(B) 95.0% C.I.for EXP(B)
Lower Upper
AVROA - -2.031 0.936 4.711 0.015** 0.131 0.021 0.821
DUALITY - -1.159 0.526 4.843 0.014** 0.028 0.112 0.881
EDU - 0.229 0.289 0.629 0.214 1.257 0.714 2.215
SKILL - 0.492 0.574 0.733 0.196 1.635 0.531 5.038
AGE + 0.031 0.016 3.947 0.024** 1.032 1.000 1.064
TENURE - -0.003 0.002 3.782 0.026** 0.997 0.994 1.000
OWN - -0.017 0.007 5.487 0.010*** 0.983 0.970 0.0997
Constant -0.853 1.755 0.236 0.314 0.426
Chi-square                                                                 30.555*** (df=8)
Cox & Snell R²                                                          10.0%
Nagelkerke R²                                                            13.3%
Hosmer and Lemeshow test                                       11.924, 15.5% (df=8)
Classification accuracy: overall                                 64.1%
Note: ***p< 0.01,  **p< 0.05, *p< 0.10. N =290 observations.
As expected, board leadership or CEO/Chairman 
duality exhibits a negative significant sign in relation to 
CEO turnover. Firms that are run by a chairman who is 
also the CEO of the company (DUALITY) are less likely 
to change their CEOs than firms that separate the two 
functions. The reason is to maintain status quo and job 
security in the same company. This finding is consistent 
with the contention that a CEO who performs dual roles 
may have a greater power internally and may be involved 
in CEO turnover decisions. In line with the conclusions 
reached by Jensen (1993), the power of the CEO may 
reduce board effectiveness, since internal control of a 
firm fails when the CEO is also a chairman of a company. 
Since the board is ineffective, the underperforming CEO is 
not subjected to turnover threat. The finding of this study 
is similar to those of Goyal and Park (2002) and Maury 
(2006), which find a negative significant relationship 
between CEO/Chairman duality and CEO turnover.
It is postulated in Hypothesis 3 that firms whose 
incumbent CEOs hold a degree qualification are less 
likely to experience CEO turnover. Results in Table 
3 show an insignificant positive sign of EDU, which 
indicates the degree qualification of CEOs, in relation 
to determining CEO turnover.  This study assumes that 
CEOs with a degree in finance or law are considered as 
CEOs with skills and functional backgrounds. Thus, 
in Hypothesis 4 we postulate that CEOs equipped 
with these qualifications are more likely to move to 
companies which offer higher compensation, as their 
skills are needed in all companies. Table 3 shows that the 
relationship between incumbent skill and turnover event 
is not significant. This result implies that the likelihood 
of CEO turnover is not influenced by CEO skills in finance 
or law. Although these skills are usually needed in most 
businesses, only six percent of the CEOs have some law 
or finance background. The insignificant coefficient of 
skill suggests that finance and legal background is not 
perceived as an important quality required by a CEO. This 
finding is in line with Zajac and Westphal (1996), who 
argue that a CEO with an industry specialization related to 
a firm’s business operation is more important, regardless 
of his level of skill and functional background.
Hypothesis 5 states that older CEOs are more likely 
to be changed than younger CEOs.  This contention is 
supported by the results in Table 3, which demonstrate a 
positively significant relationship between AGE and CEO 
turnover. This finding contradicts that of Borokovich et 
al. (2006), who report a negative relationship between 
CEO age and turnover event. They find that young CEOs 
(54 years old and below) are more likely to be changed 
than the older CEOs (more than 54 years old). However, 
our findings are similar to those of DeFond and Park 
(1999) and Goyal and Park (2002) who find a positive 
relationship between older CEOs and the probability of 
CEO turnover. They suggest that their anomalous result is 
due to the inclusion of mandatory retirement at the age 
of 55 in US firms.  
Another variable of CEO power that may influence 
CEO turnover is CEO tenure (TENURE). Tenure is 
measured as the number of months a CEO holds the 
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post. A CEO with a longer tenure is expected to be less 
likely to experience turnover than a CEO with a shorter 
tenure. The findings of this study support the contention 
that a CEO with a shorter tenure is subjected to a higher 
probability of turnover. We find that there is a negative 
relationship between TENURE and CEO turnover. This 
finding is similar to those of Goyal and Park (2002) and 
Shen and Cannella (2002). This result suggests that the 
probability of CEO turnover is higher when CEOs have a 
shorter tenure. CEOs with shorter tenures are considered 
as having less experience and knowledge compared to 
CEOs with longer tenures.
The percentage of shares owned by CEOs may also 
have a significant influence on CEO turnover. When CEOs 
have some control over firms via ownership, they may 
intervene in the CEO turnover decision. Thus, this study 
expects that there will be a negative relationship between 
CEO ownership (OWN) with CEO turnover. In other words, 
it is predicted that a CEO who owns shares in the same 
company is less likely to experience CEO turnover. As 
expected, the results in Table 3 strongly support H6, 
as the coefficient of OWN is negative and statistically 
significant at a 5 percent level. Thus, it is evident 
that CEO ownership is one of the important factors in 
determining CEO turnover. This finding reveals that the 
likelihood of CEO turnover is less likely when the CEOs 
have a controlling power in firms. 
ADDITIONAL TESTS
For the additional sensitivity test, alternative proxies are 
used to test whether the reported results are sensitive to 
the measures used. Column 1 in Table 4 lists all of the 
alternative proxies used in this study. Each alternative 
proxy was added individually to the original model and 
other variables remain constant. For instance, when the 
alternative proxy was used to measure CEO age (i.e. dummy 
variable of ‘1’ for CEOs’ age below 55 years, instead of 
number of years), all other variables remain as originally 
stated. It is believed that CEOs whose ages are below 55 
years are not subject to mandatory retirement and their 
termination is due to underperformance (Lausten 2000). 
However, the same argument can be applied to explain 
the condition of older CEOs. Older CEOs are more likely 
to be changed as they reach their retirement age and their 
knowledge may be out-dated to cope the with current 
business environment. Thus, it is expected that older 
CEOs are more likely to be changed than younger CEOs. 
However, the change of older CEOs is more of a voluntary 
basis and not due to underperformance. Results in Table 
4 show a negative relationship between dummy AGE_1 
and CEO turnover. This result implies that firms that have 
younger CEOs are less likely to experience CEO turnover 
than firms that have older CEOs. It is not surprising that 
young CEOs (who are subject to termination due to low 
performance) are not subjected to punishment because 
227 of the 290 (78%) of the sample firms are enjoying 
healthy performance during the period of study.
For the new proxy of CEO tenure (a dummy variable 
of ‘1’ if CEO tenure is less than 60 months or five years 
and ‘0’ otherwise) this study finds that the coefficient 
of TENURE_1 is positive and significant at a 1 percent 
level.  This result suggests that CEOs with a shorter tenure 
(less than 60 months) are more likely to be subjected to 
turnover than CEOs with a longer tenure. Due to their 
limited knowledge and experiences, CEOs with a shorter 
tenure are more likely to be changed than CEOs with a 
longer tenure. 
TABLE 4.  Results of CEO turnover regression using alternative proxy variables
Variables Label ExpectedSign B SE p-value
CEO Age AGEAGE_1
+
-
0.036
-1.710
0.016
0.505
0.014***
0.001***
CEO Tenure TENURETENURE_1
-
+
-0.003
0.852
0.002
0.288
0.020**
0.002***
CONCLUSION 
Out of the seven variables tested in this study, five 
variables vary significantly with CEO turnover. Firm 
performance, CEO/Chairman duality, CEO tenure and 
CEO ownership exhibit a negative relationship with CEO 
turnover, while CEO age shows a positive relationship 
with CEO turnover. As expected, firms that exercise CEO 
duality are less likely to have CEO turnover. This may be 
due to CEO/Chairman job security and continuity of their 
status quo. In other words, if a CEO/Chairman needs to 
resign from his CEO post, he may remain as the Chairman 
or he will name his children or sibling as the successor. 
Social network and human capital theories suggest 
that incumbent CEOs do accumulate powers via ownership 
control, education level, tenure or age and these powers 
will have significant influences on CEO turnover decisions. 
Results of this study support the hypothesis that CEO 
ownership will reduce the probability of CEO turnover. 
Holding some portion of a company’s shares indicates 
that a CEO may have some control in a company. Thus, 
he or she is less likely to be changed in comparison with 
to a CEO who does not own any shares. This study also 
finds that there is a positive relationship between CEO age 
40 Jurnal Pengurusan 35
and turnover, which explains that older CEOs are more 
likely to be changed than younger CEOs. This is because 
older CEOs are subjected to mandatory retirement. For 
CEO tenure, our study reveals that CEOs with short tenures 
are more likely to be subjected to turnover than CEOs 
with longer tenures. The reason is probably because a 
CEO with longer tenure is regarded as an expert who is 
capable to handle firms’ day to day operations smoothly. 
In summary, this study finds that firm performance 
and CEO power do influence CEO turnover. These findings 
reveal that firms are more likely to change their CEOs 
when they are facing low performance and having older 
CEOs. In contrast the turnovers of CEOs are less likely to 
occur when firms exercise CEO/Chairman duality; when 
CEOs possess company ownership; and when CEOs have 
longer tenures.  
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